Analysis on Cooperation and Competition Behavior of Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game - The Case Studies of Chinese Creative Industrial Clusters
Jian She Li, Le Wei Yan
Abstract
Jian She Li, Le Wei Yan
Abstract
In recent years, not only the academics pays close attention to the creative industries, but also enterprises and the government keep a watchful eye on it. Cooperation and competition behaviors of enterprises will decide their competitiveness directly, thereby affecting the competitiveness and future direction of our creative industries. In this paper, based on cooperation and competition behavior in creative industrial clusters, we establish symmetric game model between two core enterprises and asymmetric game model between the core enterprise and the adjacent down-stream one by using evolutionary game theory, then analyze its dynamic evolutionary procedure. The result show that the systems evolutionary direction is closely related to players payoff, and influenced by cooperation profit, initial cost of the cooperation, capacity for independent innovation, cooperation successful rate and systems initial status. At last, some suggestions are offered for our government which can provide a theoretical basis for integrating creative industrial clusters.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
In recent years, not only the academics pays close attention to the creative industries, but also enterprises and the government keep a watchful eye on it. Cooperation and competition behaviors of enterprises will decide their competitiveness directly, thereby affecting the competitiveness and future direction of our creative industries. In this paper, based on cooperation and competition behavior in creative industrial clusters, we establish symmetric game model between two core enterprises and asymmetric game model between the core enterprise and the adjacent down-stream one by using evolutionary game theory, then analyze its dynamic evolutionary procedure. The result show that the systems evolutionary direction is closely related to players payoff, and influenced by cooperation profit, initial cost of the cooperation, capacity for independent innovation, cooperation successful rate and systems initial status. At last, some suggestions are offered for our government which can provide a theoretical basis for integrating creative industrial clusters.
Key concepts: Competition (biology), Industrial organization, Core (optical fiber), Evolutionary game theory, Stochastic game, Profit (economics), Government (linguistics), Game theory