The Game Analysis on Education Investment Behavior of the Civilian Capital
Bai-Chen Xie
Abstract
Bai-Chen Xie
Abstract
By using the asymmetric game theory, this paper analyzes some problems occurring in the investment of the civilian capital into the education such as the distribution of property right between the inventor and the school,the negotiation of the investment quota, and the efforts of the school, etc., and finds that the low efficiency will be caused by that if the distribution is determined by the side with less contribution when contributions of the two sides are different, and the equilibrium solution got from the game theory can solve the problem effectively and the resource allocation efficiency can be increased.
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By using the asymmetric game theory, this paper analyzes some problems occurring in the investment of the civilian capital into the education such as the distribution of property right between the inventor and the school,the negotiation of the investment quota, and the efforts of the school, etc., and finds that the low efficiency will be caused by that if the distribution is determined by the side with less contribution when contributions of the two sides are different, and the equilibrium solution got from the game theory can solve the problem effectively and the resource allocation efficiency can be increased.
Key concepts: Investment (military), Economics, Negotiation, Game theory, Capital (architecture), Distribution (mathematics), Microeconomics, Capital investment