The Dynamic Game of the Independent Directors Based on the Principal-agent Framework
Zongyi Zhang
Abstract
Zongyi Zhang
Abstract
The current incentive system can not do business on the corporate governance of independent outside director.This paper establish an economic incentive for restriction mechanism model by applying an incomplete information dynamical game method for independent director,focus on two different incentive model: performance incentive model with term and stock option incentive model.Analyze what factors effect the work level.and get conclusion from these model.These conclusion can be helpful in the mechanism design of independent outside director.
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The current incentive system can not do business on the corporate governance of independent outside director.This paper establish an economic incentive for restriction mechanism model by applying an incomplete information dynamical game method for independent director,focus on two different incentive model: performance incentive model with term and stock option incentive model.Analyze what factors effect the work level.and get conclusion from these model.These conclusion can be helpful in the mechanism design of independent outside director.
Key concepts: Incentive, Corporate governance, Principal (computer security), Stock options, Mechanism (biology), Principal–agent problem, Stock (firearms), Microeconomics