2008Systems EngineeringRequires access

The Dynamic Game of the Independent Directors Based on the Principal-agent Framework

Zongyi Zhang

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Abstract

The current incentive system can not do business on the corporate governance of independent outside director.This paper establish an economic incentive for restriction mechanism model by applying an incomplete information dynamical game method for independent director,focus on two different incentive model: performance incentive model with term and stock option incentive model.Analyze what factors effect the work level.and get conclusion from these model.These conclusion can be helpful in the mechanism design of independent outside director.

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What this paper is about

The current incentive system can not do business on the corporate governance of independent outside director.This paper establish an economic incentive for restriction mechanism model by applying an incomplete information dynamical game method for independent director,focus on two different incentive model: performance incentive model with term and stock option incentive model.Analyze what factors effect the work level.and get conclusion from these model.These conclusion can be helpful in the mechanism design of independent outside director.

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Available abstract

The current incentive system can not do business on the corporate governance of independent outside director.This paper establish an economic incentive for restriction mechanism model by applying an incomplete information dynamical game method for independent director,focus on two different incentive model: performance incentive model with term and stock option incentive model.Analyze what factors effect the work level.and get conclusion from these model.These conclusion can be helpful in the mechanism design of independent outside director.

Key concepts: Incentive, Corporate governance, Principal (computer security), Stock options, Mechanism (biology), Principal–agent problem, Stock (firearms), Microeconomics

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