2005Ha'erbin gongye daxue xuebaoRequires access

A design of incentive contracts of independent directors under asymmetric information condition

Dan Liu

Open publisher page 4 citations

Abstract

The incentive mechanism of the independent directors has not yet been solved.The optimal incentive contracts between stockholders and independent directors under asymmetric information conditions through mathematic analytic methods is analyzed.The incentive coefficient of an independent director is given and the factors influencing the incentive coefficient are discussed.Results show that the incentive contracts of the independent directors are affected by abilities,effort costs,the degree of risk aversion,etc.of the independent directors.

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What this paper is about

The incentive mechanism of the independent directors has not yet been solved.The optimal incentive contracts between stockholders and independent directors under asymmetric information conditions through mathematic analytic methods is analyzed.The incentive coefficient of an independent director is given and the factors influencing the incentive coefficient are discussed.Results show that the incentive contracts of the independent directors are affected by abilities,effort costs,the degree of risk aversion,etc.of the independent directors.

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Available abstract

The incentive mechanism of the independent directors has not yet been solved.The optimal incentive contracts between stockholders and independent directors under asymmetric information conditions through mathematic analytic methods is analyzed.The incentive coefficient of an independent director is given and the factors influencing the incentive coefficient are discussed.Results show that the incentive contracts of the independent directors are affected by abilities,effort costs,the degree of risk aversion,etc.of the independent directors.

Key concepts: Incentive, Shareholder, Information asymmetry, Microeconomics, Risk aversion (psychology), Business, Mechanism (biology), Actuarial science

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