Investor Benefit Protection of State-owned Listed Companies: Evidence from Private Benefits of Corporate Control
Zou Hui
Abstract
Zou Hui
Abstract
The existing research hasn't drawn the same conclusion about the effect of state-owned listed companies in investor benefit protection.Based on the theory of private benefits of corporate control,this paper samples the companies that has transferred its control from 1997 to 2006,tests the relationship between government shares and private benefits of corporate control and explores that the government shareholders is better at investor benefit protection than others,while in the range of relative control,the upper government shareholding will make the protection worse.
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The existing research hasn't drawn the same conclusion about the effect of state-owned listed companies in investor benefit protection.Based on the theory of private benefits of corporate control,this paper samples the companies that has transferred its control from 1997 to 2006,tests the relationship between government shares and private benefits of corporate control and explores that the government shareholders is better at investor benefit protection than others,while in the range of relative control,the upper government shareholding will make the protection worse.
Key concepts: Shareholder, Business, Investor protection, Control (management), Government (linguistics), Private benefits of control, Accounting, Corporate governance