Investor Protection,Corporate Characteristics and Allocation of Control Rights
YE Jian-hon
Abstract
YE Jian-hon
Abstract
Using Chinese listed companies date from 2005-2010,this paper investigates factors that affect the allocation of corporate control rights.Empirical tests find that:regional investor protection has different effects on the large shareholders' control rights due to the different types of the companies.In state-owned companies,regional investor protection has direct and positive impact on shareholders' control rights;while in non-state-owned companies regional investor protection and corporate political connection mutually influence shareholders' control rights.In lowly competitive industry companies,investor protection has significantly positive effect on control rights of large shareholders,but the effect is not obvious in highly competitive industry companies.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Using Chinese listed companies date from 2005-2010,this paper investigates factors that affect the allocation of corporate control rights.Empirical tests find that:regional investor protection has different effects on the large shareholders' control rights due to the different types of the companies.In state-owned companies,regional investor protection has direct and positive impact on shareholders' control rights;while in non-state-owned companies regional investor protection and corporate political connection mutually influence shareholders' control rights.In lowly competitive industry companies,investor protection has significantly positive effect on control rights of large shareholders,but the effect is not obvious in highly competitive industry companies.
Key concepts: Shareholder, Business, Control (management), Investor protection, State (computer science), Politics, Empirical evidence, Accounting