2009Journal of Xi'an University of Post and TelecommunicationsRequires access

Access regulation under the bottleneck monopoly and the administrative monopoly

Kai Hu

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Abstract

After introducing competition in the natural monopoly industries,access-reject is a typical strategic behavior of the bottleneck monopoly firm which gets hold of the support of the administrative monopoly power.The aim of access-reject is to maintain the monopoly in the vertical-integration market and to limit the competition in the downstream market.Theory analysis shows that access-reject may lead to market foreclosure and retrogression of marketization in the natural monopoly industries.Therefore,access regulation is necessary to push competition.Access regulation ioncludes direct regulation by government and indirect regulation by Anti-trust Law.Because the bottleneck monopoly is usually intertwined with the administrative monopoly,the efficiency of access regulation depends on the break of the latter.

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What this paper is about

After introducing competition in the natural monopoly industries,access-reject is a typical strategic behavior of the bottleneck monopoly firm which gets hold of the support of the administrative monopoly power.The aim of access-reject is to maintain the monopoly in the vertical-integration market and to limit the competition in the downstream market.Theory analysis shows that access-reject may lead to market foreclosure and retrogression of marketization in the natural monopoly industries.Therefore,access regulation is necessary to push competition.Access regulation ioncludes direct regulation by government and indirect regulation by Anti-trust Law.Because the bottleneck monopoly is usually intertwined with the administrative monopoly,the efficiency of access regulation depends on the break of the latter.

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Available abstract

After introducing competition in the natural monopoly industries,access-reject is a typical strategic behavior of the bottleneck monopoly firm which gets hold of the support of the administrative monopoly power.The aim of access-reject is to maintain the monopoly in the vertical-integration market and to limit the competition in the downstream market.Theory analysis shows that access-reject may lead to market foreclosure and retrogression of marketization in the natural monopoly industries.Therefore,access regulation is necessary to push competition.Access regulation ioncludes direct regulation by government and indirect regulation by Anti-trust Law.Because the bottleneck monopoly is usually intertwined with the administrative monopoly,the efficiency of access regulation depends on the break of the latter.

Key concepts: Monopoly, Natural monopoly, Bottleneck, Competition (biology), Industrial organization, Economics, Market power, Government (linguistics)

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