2009Economic SurveyRequires access

On the Access Regulation in Bottleneck Monopoly

Kai Hu

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Abstract

After competition is introduced in natural monopoly industries,access reject is a typical strategic behavior of the bottleneck monopoly firms,which intend to maintain the monopoly in the vertical-integration market and limit the competition in the downstream market.The support of administrative monopoly power to bottleneck monopoly may reinforce the access-reject.Theoretical analyses show that access-reject may lead to the close of downstream competitive market in the natural monopoly industries and the retrogression of marketization.Therefore it is necessary to introduce access regulation to promote competition.Because the bottleneck monopoly is usually intertwined with the administrative monopoly in the transitional period,the efficiency of access regulation depends on breaking the administrative monopoly in which government and enterprises are unseparated.

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After competition is introduced in natural monopoly industries,access reject is a typical strategic behavior of the bottleneck monopoly firms,which intend to maintain the monopoly in the vertical-integration market and limit the competition in the downstream market.The support of administrative monopoly power to bottleneck monopoly may reinforce the access-reject.Theoretical analyses show that access-reject may lead to the close of downstream competitive market in the natural monopoly industries and the retrogression of marketization.Therefore it is necessary to introduce access regulation to promote competition.Because the bottleneck monopoly is usually intertwined with the administrative monopoly in the transitional period,the efficiency of access regulation depends on breaking the administrative monopoly in which government and enterprises are unseparated.

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Available abstract

After competition is introduced in natural monopoly industries,access reject is a typical strategic behavior of the bottleneck monopoly firms,which intend to maintain the monopoly in the vertical-integration market and limit the competition in the downstream market.The support of administrative monopoly power to bottleneck monopoly may reinforce the access-reject.Theoretical analyses show that access-reject may lead to the close of downstream competitive market in the natural monopoly industries and the retrogression of marketization.Therefore it is necessary to introduce access regulation to promote competition.Because the bottleneck monopoly is usually intertwined with the administrative monopoly in the transitional period,the efficiency of access regulation depends on breaking the administrative monopoly in which government and enterprises are unseparated.

Key concepts: Monopoly, Natural monopoly, Bottleneck, Competition (biology), Industrial organization, Economics, Downstream (manufacturing), Market power

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