Empirical Study on the Principal-Agent Problem in the M&A of Chinese Listed Company

With the development of economy and capital market,and the improvement of law in China,merger and acquisition(MA) has become a very important strategy for a company,for many famous companies have employed the strategy successfully for development purpose.This study focuses on the agency problem during the process of MA.Based on the review and analysis of relevant theories,the author holds that there are two types of agency problems in MA:agency problems between managers and shareholders and between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.The thesis employs empirical methodology to analyze interior agency problems faced by China's listed companies merged or acquired from 2006 to 2007.After putting forward hypothesis and making quantitative and regressive analysis of selected samples with the econometric software SPSS,the study draws a conclusion that the reduction of agency cost caused by MA could improve the performance of the target corporation.Influenced by some factors likefinancial statements MA,the research results are not perfectly consistent with the theoretical hypothesis.To solve the problems,Chinese government,companies should take immediate measures to realize effective and healthy MAs.And in the end of this paper,the author propose some improvement for futher reseach.