The Influence of Bilateral Investment Incentive by the Unsymmetrical Bargaining Power
Xiaofeng Shao
Abstract
Xiaofeng Shao
Abstract
Because the collaboration enterprises had different bargaining power,the allocation shares of the collaboration surplus were unsymmetrical.So the bilateral investments in the collaboration were influenced by the bargaining power dejectedly.The paper studied how the bargaining power influenced the collaboration allocation modes in collaboration contract.And then studied the optimization of the bilateral investment incentive through setting up general mathematic models.By comparing with the social optimization investment,the paper also studied the disadvantages of different modes and the causation.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Because the collaboration enterprises had different bargaining power,the allocation shares of the collaboration surplus were unsymmetrical.So the bilateral investments in the collaboration were influenced by the bargaining power dejectedly.The paper studied how the bargaining power influenced the collaboration allocation modes in collaboration contract.And then studied the optimization of the bilateral investment incentive through setting up general mathematic models.By comparing with the social optimization investment,the paper also studied the disadvantages of different modes and the causation.
Key concepts: Bargaining power, Investment (military), Incentive, Microeconomics, Power (physics), Economics, Causation, Business