2007Journal of systems managementRequires access

The Influence of Bilateral Investment Incentive by the Unsymmetrical Bargaining Power

Xiaofeng Shao

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Abstract

Because the collaboration enterprises had different bargaining power,the allocation shares of the collaboration surplus were unsymmetrical.So the bilateral investments in the collaboration were influenced by the bargaining power dejectedly.The paper studied how the bargaining power influenced the collaboration allocation modes in collaboration contract.And then studied the optimization of the bilateral investment incentive through setting up general mathematic models.By comparing with the social optimization investment,the paper also studied the disadvantages of different modes and the causation.

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What this paper is about

Because the collaboration enterprises had different bargaining power,the allocation shares of the collaboration surplus were unsymmetrical.So the bilateral investments in the collaboration were influenced by the bargaining power dejectedly.The paper studied how the bargaining power influenced the collaboration allocation modes in collaboration contract.And then studied the optimization of the bilateral investment incentive through setting up general mathematic models.By comparing with the social optimization investment,the paper also studied the disadvantages of different modes and the causation.

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Available abstract

Because the collaboration enterprises had different bargaining power,the allocation shares of the collaboration surplus were unsymmetrical.So the bilateral investments in the collaboration were influenced by the bargaining power dejectedly.The paper studied how the bargaining power influenced the collaboration allocation modes in collaboration contract.And then studied the optimization of the bilateral investment incentive through setting up general mathematic models.By comparing with the social optimization investment,the paper also studied the disadvantages of different modes and the causation.

Key concepts: Bargaining power, Investment (military), Incentive, Microeconomics, Power (physics), Economics, Causation, Business

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