2011•Logistics TechnologyRequires access

Study on Decision-making and Incentive Contract Design for Relationship-oriented Investment in Logistics Outsourcing

Bo Li

Abstract

The paper studies the hold-up risk in relationship specific investment and designs its revenue sharing incentive contract.Through analysis,optimization and calculation of the contract,the paper obtains the optimal specific investment level of the 3PL enterprise and the optimal contract terms for the outsourcing company under information asymmetry.At the end,the paper analyzes the factors influencing output sharing in the contract and their inter-relationship.

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Available abstract

Key concepts: Outsourcing, Incentive, Business, Investment (military), Information asymmetry, Revenue sharing, Contract management, Industrial organization