Research on the Game Theory based Network Attack-Defense and its Application
Feng Gao
Abstract
Feng Gao
Abstract
The network attack-defense model is important composition of network security. The current-used models usually cannot describe the characters of the interaction and confrontation of the both attack-defense sides, which is the chief drawback. The paper proposes the game theory based attack-defense models, defines the elements and the Nash equilibrium of both side of the game. Using the dictionary-attack as an example, this paper characterizes the confrontation policy and its effective, and the Nash equilibrium as the result of Gambit.
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The network attack-defense model is important composition of network security. The current-used models usually cannot describe the characters of the interaction and confrontation of the both attack-defense sides, which is the chief drawback. The paper proposes the game theory based attack-defense models, defines the elements and the Nash equilibrium of both side of the game. Using the dictionary-attack as an example, this paper characterizes the confrontation policy and its effective, and the Nash equilibrium as the result of Gambit.
Key concepts: Gambit, Computer science, Nash equilibrium, Game theory, Computer security, Best response, Mathematical economics, Simulation