2010Unpublished venueRequires access

A network security assessment model based on attack-defense game theory

Baoyi Wang, Jianqiang Cai, Shaomin Zhang, Li Jun

Open publisher page 22 citations

Abstract

In this paper a network security assessment model based on game theory is presented to evaluate network security and perform active defense. The model uses the game relationship between attacker and defender to formally describe and quantitatively calculate benefits and costs of both sides. By solving mixed Nash equilibrium of the model, we could obtain the knowledge of possible attack paths of attacker and defender's optimizing strategy. In the end, a simple scenario is presented to illustrate the usage of the proposed model in network security assessment. The results indicate that the model and method is effective and efficient.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

In this paper a network security assessment model based on game theory is presented to evaluate network security and perform active defense. The model uses the game relationship between attacker and defender to formally describe and quantitatively calculate benefits and costs of both sides. By solving mixed Nash equilibrium of the model, we could obtain the knowledge of possible attack paths of attacker and defender's optimizing strategy. In the end, a simple scenario is presented to illustrate the usage of the proposed model in network security assessment. The results indicate that the model and method is effective and efficient.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 22 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

In this paper a network security assessment model based on game theory is presented to evaluate network security and perform active defense. The model uses the game relationship between attacker and defender to formally describe and quantitatively calculate benefits and costs of both sides. By solving mixed Nash equilibrium of the model, we could obtain the knowledge of possible attack paths of attacker and defender's optimizing strategy. In the end, a simple scenario is presented to illustrate the usage of the proposed model in network security assessment. The results indicate that the model and method is effective and efficient.

Key concepts: Computer science, Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Network security, Best response, Computer security, Computer security model, Simple (philosophy)

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
A network security assessment model based on attack-defense game theory — Research Paper | ScholarLens