A network security assessment model based on attack-defense game theory
Baoyi Wang, Jianqiang Cai, Shaomin Zhang, Li Jun
Abstract
Baoyi Wang, Jianqiang Cai, Shaomin Zhang, Li Jun
Abstract
In this paper a network security assessment model based on game theory is presented to evaluate network security and perform active defense. The model uses the game relationship between attacker and defender to formally describe and quantitatively calculate benefits and costs of both sides. By solving mixed Nash equilibrium of the model, we could obtain the knowledge of possible attack paths of attacker and defender's optimizing strategy. In the end, a simple scenario is presented to illustrate the usage of the proposed model in network security assessment. The results indicate that the model and method is effective and efficient.
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In this paper a network security assessment model based on game theory is presented to evaluate network security and perform active defense. The model uses the game relationship between attacker and defender to formally describe and quantitatively calculate benefits and costs of both sides. By solving mixed Nash equilibrium of the model, we could obtain the knowledge of possible attack paths of attacker and defender's optimizing strategy. In the end, a simple scenario is presented to illustrate the usage of the proposed model in network security assessment. The results indicate that the model and method is effective and efficient.
Key concepts: Computer science, Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Network security, Best response, Computer security, Computer security model, Simple (philosophy)