Knowledge Sharing Incentive Model of Project Team Members Based on Knowledge Complementary Effect
Shi Jiangan
Abstract
Shi Jiangan
Abstract
Based on the integration of project management,team incentive and knowledge management,three incentive models of knowledge sharing on project team members are built,focusing the characteristic of knowledge complementary effect in project context. Then the deep connection among knowledge sharing effort,incentive and knowledge sharing output are analyzed. The results show that,firstly,the traditional incentive model does not have much effect on knowledge sharing effort. Secondly,in the latter two models,the more the knowledge complementary effect is,the greater the knowledge sharing effort members exert,and the principal will give more incentives to obtain more net profits. Thirdly,compared with the latter two models,direct incentive on knowledge sharing behavior will make the principal obtain more net profits while this model is hard to complete. One of the main reasons is the unobservable effort of knowledge sharing.
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Based on the integration of project management,team incentive and knowledge management,three incentive models of knowledge sharing on project team members are built,focusing the characteristic of knowledge complementary effect in project context. Then the deep connection among knowledge sharing effort,incentive and knowledge sharing output are analyzed. The results show that,firstly,the traditional incentive model does not have much effect on knowledge sharing effort. Secondly,in the latter two models,the more the knowledge complementary effect is,the greater the knowledge sharing effort members exert,and the principal will give more incentives to obtain more net profits. Thirdly,compared with the latter two models,direct incentive on knowledge sharing behavior will make the principal obtain more net profits while this model is hard to complete. One of the main reasons is the unobservable effort of knowledge sharing.
Key concepts: Incentive, Knowledge sharing, Knowledge management, Unobservable, Principal (computer security), Context (archaeology), Knowledge value chain, Computer science