Local Officials' Lack of Efficiency in Economic Activities——An Explanation in the Incentive Theory
Xiong Yi
Abstract
Xiong Yi
Abstract
In the principal-agent relationship,incentive is effective under certain required conditions.But in the political principal-agent relationship,as it is difficult to evaluate officials' performance and reward them in material benefits,it would be easy for them to cultivate political objectives in economic activities,leading to the absence of efficiency in their evaluation and material incentives.One specific case is our local officials' lack of efficiency in their economic activities.
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In the principal-agent relationship,incentive is effective under certain required conditions.But in the political principal-agent relationship,as it is difficult to evaluate officials' performance and reward them in material benefits,it would be easy for them to cultivate political objectives in economic activities,leading to the absence of efficiency in their evaluation and material incentives.One specific case is our local officials' lack of efficiency in their economic activities.
Key concepts: Incentive, Principal (computer security), Politics, Principal–agent problem, Public economics, Economic efficiency, Economics, Business