2007•Journal of Zhengzhou Institute of Aeronautical Industry ManagementRequires access

Goal Analysis on Chinese Local Officers' Economic Competition

Xiong Yi

Open publisher page 0 citations

Abstract

The economic activities of China local authority official are lacking in efficiency.The reason lies in: Political purpose of officer's economic competition,This kind of purpose is that the external incentive of the official of the necessary condition is to short.First,it is lack to incentive the payoff.incentive has the financial restraint which limites the monetary payoff incentive so the result has caused the political purpose of agent's economic competition.Second,performance examination is not accurate enough.and the client has difficult goal to confirm the agent produces,this offers the condition the political purpose is realized.If client goals is confirmed and agent producing is appraised easy,so the problem can appear that client goals are one-sided and agent produce is appraised simple that make officers' political purpose easy to realize too.The external incentive of the official is invalid because the condition of the officer's incentive is deficient.Therefore official's intrinsic incentive is extremely important.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

The economic activities of China local authority official are lacking in efficiency.The reason lies in: Political purpose of officer's economic competition,This kind of purpose is that the external incentive of the official of the necessary condition is to short.First,it is lack to incentive the payoff.incentive has the financial restraint which limites the monetary payoff incentive so the result has caused the political purpose of agent's economic competition.Second,performance examination is not accurate enough.and the client has difficult goal to confirm the agent produces,this offers the condition the political purpose is realized.If client goals is confirmed and agent producing is appraised easy,so the problem can appear that client goals are one-sided and agent produce is appraised simple that make officers' political purpose easy to realize too.The external incentive of the official is invalid because the condition of the officer's incentive is deficient.Therefore official's intrinsic incentive is extremely important.

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

The economic activities of China local authority official are lacking in efficiency.The reason lies in: Political purpose of officer's economic competition,This kind of purpose is that the external incentive of the official of the necessary condition is to short.First,it is lack to incentive the payoff.incentive has the financial restraint which limites the monetary payoff incentive so the result has caused the political purpose of agent's economic competition.Second,performance examination is not accurate enough.and the client has difficult goal to confirm the agent produces,this offers the condition the political purpose is realized.If client goals is confirmed and agent producing is appraised easy,so the problem can appear that client goals are one-sided and agent produce is appraised simple that make officers' political purpose easy to realize too.The external incentive of the official is invalid because the condition of the officer's incentive is deficient.Therefore official's intrinsic incentive is extremely important.

Key concepts: Incentive, Officer, Competition (biology), Politics, Stochastic game, Economics, Simple (philosophy), Business

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Goal Analysis on Chinese Local Officers' Economic Competition — Research Paper | ScholarLens