Preventing Ex-ante and Ex-post Collusion between Independent Directors and Managers
Wang Wei
Abstract
Wang Wei
Abstract
Both in theory and practice,the collusion between managers and independent directors couldn't be neglected in Chinese listed companies.Based on the research of collusion-prevention theories in foreign countries and in China,a model of optimal incentive mechanism of preventing ex-ante and ex-post collusions is established.The necessary conditions and some suggestions for its application are presented to promote the normal and efficient exertion of independent director system.
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Both in theory and practice,the collusion between managers and independent directors couldn't be neglected in Chinese listed companies.Based on the research of collusion-prevention theories in foreign countries and in China,a model of optimal incentive mechanism of preventing ex-ante and ex-post collusions is established.The necessary conditions and some suggestions for its application are presented to promote the normal and efficient exertion of independent director system.
Key concepts: Collusion, Ex-ante, Incentive, Business, China, Economics, Industrial organization, Microeconomics