Research on Model of Collusion-proofness Incentive Mechanism for Independent Directors
Huiping Liu, Zhang Shi-ying
Abstract
Huiping Liu, Zhang Shi-ying
Abstract
In view of the tendency that independent directors have weak function and collusion problem exists in the operation of independent directors system in China,a model of collusion-proofness incentive mechanism under the middle and small shareholders-independent director-manager structure is established and optimal contract is acquired. Based on this model, suggestions are expounded that a discriminatory reward to independent directors should be offered according to information they revealed and commitment mechanism be indispensable,in particular a high punishment to their dereliction of duty.
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In view of the tendency that independent directors have weak function and collusion problem exists in the operation of independent directors system in China,a model of collusion-proofness incentive mechanism under the middle and small shareholders-independent director-manager structure is established and optimal contract is acquired. Based on this model, suggestions are expounded that a discriminatory reward to independent directors should be offered according to information they revealed and commitment mechanism be indispensable,in particular a high punishment to their dereliction of duty.
Key concepts: Collusion, Punishment (psychology), Incentive, Mechanism (biology), Shareholder, Microeconomics, Duty, Function (biology)