2006•Unpublished venueRequires access

Multi-task Based Principal-agent Analysis for Engineering Supervision

Wan Shi-wei

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Abstract

The relationship between a project employer and an engineering supervisor is a multi-task principal-agent relationship under the framework of engineering supervision.This paper analyses the multi-task principal-agent problems on the basis of multi-task principal-agent models.It shows that the incentive system of engineering supervision with multi-task principal-agent model is different from the one with single-task model.Two important impact factors on the incentive strength coefficient are given as the job difficulty undertaken by engineering supervisors and the cost dependency between tasks,which have to be taken into consideration for the incentive system establishment to prevent its weakness.

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What this paper is about

The relationship between a project employer and an engineering supervisor is a multi-task principal-agent relationship under the framework of engineering supervision.This paper analyses the multi-task principal-agent problems on the basis of multi-task principal-agent models.It shows that the incentive system of engineering supervision with multi-task principal-agent model is different from the one with single-task model.Two important impact factors on the incentive strength coefficient are given as the job difficulty undertaken by engineering supervisors and the cost dependency between tasks,which have to be taken into consideration for the incentive system establishment to prevent its weakness.

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Available abstract

The relationship between a project employer and an engineering supervisor is a multi-task principal-agent relationship under the framework of engineering supervision.This paper analyses the multi-task principal-agent problems on the basis of multi-task principal-agent models.It shows that the incentive system of engineering supervision with multi-task principal-agent model is different from the one with single-task model.Two important impact factors on the incentive strength coefficient are given as the job difficulty undertaken by engineering supervisors and the cost dependency between tasks,which have to be taken into consideration for the incentive system establishment to prevent its weakness.

Key concepts: Principal (computer security), Incentive, Supervisor, Task (project management), Dependency (UML), Computer science, Principal–agent problem, Risk analysis (engineering)

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