Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Construction Supervision
Shudong Wang
Abstract
Shudong Wang
Abstract
Taking the scale of projects investment into account,this paper introduces the level of supervision competence,the degree of effort and their impact factors into the principal-agent theory.By analyzing the optimal project supervision incentive coefficient,the incentives are turned to be more effective,the supervisors take more initiatives and moral misconducts are reduced.
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Taking the scale of projects investment into account,this paper introduces the level of supervision competence,the degree of effort and their impact factors into the principal-agent theory.By analyzing the optimal project supervision incentive coefficient,the incentives are turned to be more effective,the supervisors take more initiatives and moral misconducts are reduced.
Key concepts: Incentive, Competence (human resources), Principal (computer security), Business, Principal–agent problem, Mechanism (biology), Microeconomics, Incentive program