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2015•Unpublished venueRequires access

A Game Analysis of Incentive Mechanism for Supervision over Rural Development Projects

Fujiang Sun

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Abstract

Beginning with information asymmetry between a development agency and its internal quality supervision department in the course of quality supervision over a rural development project, this paper analyzes the principal -- agent relationship between the development agency and its quality supervisors, as well as moral hazards which may arise from this relationship, and establishes a game model regarding the related incentive mechanism to find out the best incentive mechanism that the principal applies to the supervision agent and to define the incentive coefficient, with a view to incentivizing the supervision agent and effectively reducing the occurrence of moral hazards.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Beginning with information asymmetry between a development agency and its internal quality supervision department in the course of quality supervision over a rural development project, this paper analyzes the principal -- agent relationship between the development agency and its quality supervisors, as well as moral hazards which may arise from this relationship, and establishes a game model regarding the related incentive mechanism to find out the best incentive mechanism that the principal applies to the supervision agent and to define the incentive coefficient, with a view to incentivizing the supervision agent and effectively reducing the occurrence of moral hazards.

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Available abstract

Beginning with information asymmetry between a development agency and its internal quality supervision department in the course of quality supervision over a rural development project, this paper analyzes the principal -- agent relationship between the development agency and its quality supervisors, as well as moral hazards which may arise from this relationship, and establishes a game model regarding the related incentive mechanism to find out the best incentive mechanism that the principal applies to the supervision agent and to define the incentive coefficient, with a view to incentivizing the supervision agent and effectively reducing the occurrence of moral hazards.

Key concepts: Incentive, Principal–agent problem, Moral hazard, Principal (computer security), Agency (philosophy), Information asymmetry, Mechanism (biology), Quality (philosophy)

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