2008Cai-jing yanjiuRequires access

Rent Seeking,Power Corruption and Social Welfare——The Perspective of Supply of Public Goods

Lu Jin

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Abstract

The generation of principal-agent issue is due to the lack of incentive and supervision mechanism.It not only blurs power boundaries among governments and leads to the lack of vertical supervision,but also has a negative effect on democratic supervision and especially induces government corruption and losses of social welfare.Based on this logic relation and rent-seeking factor,the paper establishes a comprehensive analytical framework and discusses the relationship among principal-agent,governmental rent seeking and social welfare in the perspective of public-good supply.Owing to the above analysis,the paper provides a systematic explanation of the reasons of power corruption and its impact on economic development in China's political system reform.

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The generation of principal-agent issue is due to the lack of incentive and supervision mechanism.It not only blurs power boundaries among governments and leads to the lack of vertical supervision,but also has a negative effect on democratic supervision and especially induces government corruption and losses of social welfare.Based on this logic relation and rent-seeking factor,the paper establishes a comprehensive analytical framework and discusses the relationship among principal-agent,governmental rent seeking and social welfare in the perspective of public-good supply.Owing to the above analysis,the paper provides a systematic explanation of the reasons of power corruption and its impact on economic development in China's political system reform.

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Available abstract

The generation of principal-agent issue is due to the lack of incentive and supervision mechanism.It not only blurs power boundaries among governments and leads to the lack of vertical supervision,but also has a negative effect on democratic supervision and especially induces government corruption and losses of social welfare.Based on this logic relation and rent-seeking factor,the paper establishes a comprehensive analytical framework and discusses the relationship among principal-agent,governmental rent seeking and social welfare in the perspective of public-good supply.Owing to the above analysis,the paper provides a systematic explanation of the reasons of power corruption and its impact on economic development in China's political system reform.

Key concepts: Incentive, Language change, Rent-seeking, Public economics, Public good, Economics, Social Welfare, Government (linguistics)

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