Analysis on Property Rights Institution Reform of Rural Enterprise
Dong Liu
Abstract
Dong Liu
Abstract
The Policy decision efficiency caused by separating of information and ability of policy decision and risk-taking is the basic cause of instititution reform in rural enterprise, which is also due to the difficulty of property rights bounds in transaction of management rights. The institution reform is in fact a large scale of property rights transaction. The higher evaluation of future revenue of manager than public ownership property rights makes institution reform smooth. Overall, institution reform follows one's free will and the result is mutual-win.
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The Policy decision efficiency caused by separating of information and ability of policy decision and risk-taking is the basic cause of instititution reform in rural enterprise, which is also due to the difficulty of property rights bounds in transaction of management rights. The institution reform is in fact a large scale of property rights transaction. The higher evaluation of future revenue of manager than public ownership property rights makes institution reform smooth. Overall, institution reform follows one's free will and the result is mutual-win.
Key concepts: Property rights, Institution, Database transaction, Transaction cost, Business, Revenue, Property (philosophy), Public institution