2012•Unpublished venueRequires access

Airpower and Ground Armies : Essays on the Evolution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine, 1940-1943

Daniel R. Mortensen

Open publisher page 5 citations

Abstract

Abstract : Long before the current struggle between the Army and Air Force over the deep attack mission, the services debated employment of air resources. Among the earliest roles and missions issues of the 193Os, the Army argued that ground commanders needed to air resources for unity of principles. Airmen countered by citing control principles. Historians have often suggested that the issue of centralized command was settled by the Battle of Kasserine Pass early in World War II. Continued research has shown that the centralized air command, as well as air superiority, was well established in published doctrine several years before World War II. Nevertheless, Mrica was argued to be an effective testing ground even though it could hardly fill that role because of the immaturity of operations at that time. No one was arguing that support of land operations was an inappropriate role for airpower. The argument was how to carry out that task.

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Abstract : Long before the current struggle between the Army and Air Force over the deep attack mission, the services debated employment of air resources. Among the earliest roles and missions issues of the 193Os, the Army argued that ground commanders needed to air resources for unity of principles. Airmen countered by citing control principles. Historians have often suggested that the issue of centralized command was settled by the Battle of Kasserine Pass early in World War II. Continued research has shown that the centralized air command, as well as air superiority, was well established in published doctrine several years before World War II. Nevertheless, Mrica was argued to be an effective testing ground even though it could hardly fill that role because of the immaturity of operations at that time. No one was arguing that support of land operations was an inappropriate role for airpower. The argument was how to carry out that task.

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Available abstract

Abstract : Long before the current struggle between the Army and Air Force over the deep attack mission, the services debated employment of air resources. Among the earliest roles and missions issues of the 193Os, the Army argued that ground commanders needed to air resources for unity of principles. Airmen countered by citing control principles. Historians have often suggested that the issue of centralized command was settled by the Battle of Kasserine Pass early in World War II. Continued research has shown that the centralized air command, as well as air superiority, was well established in published doctrine several years before World War II. Nevertheless, Mrica was argued to be an effective testing ground even though it could hardly fill that role because of the immaturity of operations at that time. No one was arguing that support of land operations was an inappropriate role for airpower. The argument was how to carry out that task.

Key concepts: Doctrine, Battle, Argument (complex analysis), Military doctrine, Military strategy, Political science, World War II, Command and control

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Airpower and Ground Armies : Essays on the Evolution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine, 1940-1943 — Research Paper | ScholarLens