What makes Kuhn’s epistemology a social epistemology?

One of Kuhn’s key contributions to the philosophy of science was to direct our attention to the epistemic relevance of the social dimensions of scientific inquiry. Kuhn shows us that there are limits to what we can learn about science and scientific knowledge when we restrict ourselves to a study of the logic of science, as the logical positivists and Popper do. Scientific inquiry is a complex social activity. And the social dimensions of science play an important role in ensuring the success of science. Kuhn’s epistemology of science is thus a social epistemology of science. Kuhn, however, does not describe his project as a social epistemology of science. This is not surprising, given that the term “social epistemology” became widely used among philosophers only in the 1980s, with the publication of the journal Social Epistemology . The term “social epistemology” has come to mean different things to different people. Sometimes it connotes the study of such things as expertise or testimony as sources of knowledge (see Schmitt 1994, 4–17; Goldman 1999, chapter 4). At other times, social epistemology concerns science policy issues, including whether and to what extent the public which pays for science through taxation should shape the scientific research agenda (see, for example, Fuller 1999). And “social epistemology” sometimes connotes a concern with whether the social characteristics of inquirers affect their prospects of developing an objective account of the world or some part of it (see Schmaus 2008). Kuhn’s epistemology of science is a social epistemology because he sought to understand how the social dimensions of science contribute to the success of science.