Evolutionary Game Analysis of Information Security Investment
You Xin-gang
Abstract
You Xin-gang
Abstract
According to the bounded rationality of organizations in reality,we analyze the information security investment of enterprise organization based on evolutionary game theory,and sets up the information security investment game model by the payoff matrix,by using Replicator Dynamics to analyze the evolutionary game in three kinds of situations.The result reveals that investment cost is the key for organizations to choose the strategy,and predicts the long-term stable trend of information security investment,which provides useful guidance for information security investment.
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According to the bounded rationality of organizations in reality,we analyze the information security investment of enterprise organization based on evolutionary game theory,and sets up the information security investment game model by the payoff matrix,by using Replicator Dynamics to analyze the evolutionary game in three kinds of situations.The result reveals that investment cost is the key for organizations to choose the strategy,and predicts the long-term stable trend of information security investment,which provides useful guidance for information security investment.
Key concepts: Replicator equation, Evolutionary game theory, Stochastic game, Investment (military), Bounded rationality, Game theory, Information security, Normal-form game