2015•Unpublished venueRequires access

Evolutionary Game Analysis between Service of Public Library and the Investment of Government

Meijun Chen, Shuangliang Tian, Ping Chen

Abstract

Using the evolutionary game theory, this essay researches the game between the service level of public library and the investment of government, establishes the dissymmetrical evolutionary game model and replicator dynamics equation, analyses and discusses the replicator dynamics equation, gets the evolutionary rule and path of the game subject behavior choice.

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Key concepts: Replicator equation, Evolutionary game theory, Game theory, Government (linguistics), Investment (military), Computer science, Service (business), Evolutionary computation