NATO and arms control: Alliance enlargement and the CFE Treaty

The ongoing realisation of the enlargement of the Western alliance will create a new challenge for the\nfuture of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). At present Russia strictly opposes the\nenlargement and has rejected any compromise. Russian diplomats have demanded that the weapons of\nthe East-Central European countries should be counted as part of the NATO group ceilings if these\ncountries join the Western alliance. They have indicated that Russia could withdraw from the treaty if\nthis is not done. From the Russian point of view, it seems to be a political circumvention of the CFE\nTreaty if East-Central European countries accede to NATO without changing their CFE group of states\nmembership. With its new proposal on the modernisation of the CFE Treaty on 23 April 1996 in\nVienna, the Russian Federation underlined its principal rejection of the enlargement and increased the\npolitical pressure on the West because it could use its opposition to enlargement as an instrument to\nblock the modernisation of CFE.\nOn the other hand NATO countries argue that from the point of international law the enlargement\nwould have no effect on the treaty. However, there is an admission that the consequences for the treaty\ncould only be evaluated if new members were actually to join the alliance. Within NATO there is in\ngeneral a broad consensus to offer Russia some kind of compensation. What is still a matter of dispute\nis the time, nature and extent of the appropriate Western accommodations because the moment and\nextent of enlargement have not yet been decided.\nIn spite of the fact that there is no movement in the central question, one can see a slight rapprochement\nbetween the sides on a subordinate level. During the CFE Review Conference all participants\nagreed to the Russian request to start immediately negotiations "aimed at improving the operation of\nthe Treaty in a changing environment". The "scope and parameters" for these talks "should be defined\nas a matter of priority" and a "progress report" should be presented at the OSCE Lisbon Summit, including\n"recommendations on the way ahead". In its new proposal Russia has also hinted at certain\npossibilities for compromise. It is no longer demanding a renegotiation of the CFE Treaty, a "supplementary\nagreement" would suffice, and it is being suggested that there would be no need for a formal\nratification of adjustment measures. These are very important steps to reduce the fears of many CFE\nmember states that negotiations on adaptation and modernisation could be a slippery road to the relaxation\nof the treaty requirements. Finally, the ceilings for the newly proposed alliance sufficiency rule\nare being left open, which signals a preparedness to be flexible in negotiations.\nCooperative security policy for Europe and the CFE Treaty can only survive if both sides are prepared\nfor a fair compromise. But a compromise requires a clear understanding of what is at stake and of what\nboth sides want for their security. In this context it is not good policy for Russia simply to say no to\nthe enlargement of NATO, because this would mean abandoning any chance of influencing the price\nthe West must pay for it. Secondly, Russia needs to make a clear decision on the question of what it\nseeks to obtain from NATO. Also, NATO must answer specific questions: will NATO enlargement\nstop after the accession of the Visegrad states, or will it be an open process? The answer will have a\nprofound impact on possible solutions. The paradox of the present situation is that neither side has yet\nmade its position clear enough for the other side to be able to decide on its own negotiating strategy.