Opacity and the Ought-to-Be
Lou Goble
Abstract
Lou Goble
Abstract
In this regard, deontic logic would seem to be the nicest member of the modal logic family. This is how it should be. One expects no problems interpreting quantification into deontic contexts. Unlike the logics for alethic necessity or belief, with deontic logic there is not even a temptation to think that the values of the individual variables are intensions, or individual concepts, or possibilia (permissibilia ?). Statements of obligation, permission, prohibition, etc. seema to be directly about persons or things regardless of how they are conceived or described. The deontic operators thus certainly seem to be extensional; nevertheless, when principles of extensionality are assumed for standard systems of deontic logic, paradox appears.1
OpenAlex reports 6 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
In this regard, deontic logic would seem to be the nicest member of the modal logic family. This is how it should be. One expects no problems interpreting quantification into deontic contexts. Unlike the logics for alethic necessity or belief, with deontic logic there is not even a temptation to think that the values of the individual variables are intensions, or individual concepts, or possibilia (permissibilia ?). Statements of obligation, permission, prohibition, etc. seema to be directly about persons or things regardless of how they are conceived or described. The deontic operators thus certainly seem to be extensional; nevertheless, when principles of extensionality are assumed for standard systems of deontic logic, paradox appears.1
Key concepts: Opacity, Physics, Optics