Jing Yu
Abstract
Targeting the principal-agent relationship between logistics outsourcing enterprises and suppliers of third-party logistics, a principal-agent model is established. The risk cost of the third-party logistics suppliers and the incentive cost of the logistics outsourcing enterprises is analyzed; a designing ideal of protection from risks is put forward.
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Targeting the principal-agent relationship between logistics outsourcing enterprises and suppliers of third-party logistics, a principal-agent model is established. The risk cost of the third-party logistics suppliers and the incentive cost of the logistics outsourcing enterprises is analyzed; a designing ideal of protection from risks is put forward.
Key concepts: Outsourcing, Business, Principal (computer security), Incentive, Third party, Industrial organization, Humanitarian Logistics, Knowledge process outsourcing