2016•Economics LettersOpen access
Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
Brian Baisa, Stanislav Rabinovich
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Brian Baisa, Stanislav Rabinovich
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Key concepts: Vickrey auction, Microeconomics, Revenue equivalence, Auction theory, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction, Generalized second-price auction, English auction, Economics