Does the Introduction of Independent Redistricting Reduce Congressional Partisanship

In contemporary American politics, partisanship is frequently seen as excessive, even if some aspects of partisanship may fundamentally characterize the U.S. political system.To reduce partisanship in the process of drawing political districts, some states have implemented independent redistricting commissions and related forms of depoliticized systems for redistricting.This paper analyzes whether the presence of relatively independent redistricting also reduces partisanship in the voting behavior of congressional representatives elected from the relevant redefined districts.Contrary to the initial expectations of the authors, the evidence reviewed here suggests that politically independent redistricting seems to reduce partisanship in the voting behavior of congressional delegations from affected states in statistically significant ways.The authors conclude with notes about the study's implications for further research into redistricting and partisanship.I.THE PERCEIVED PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE PARTISANSHIP F ERVENT support for one political party's policies when alternative policies are championed by another political party-one way to define partisanship-may be a normal, unavoidable, and perhaps even desirable byproduct of the basic constitutional design of the American political system, with its structural divisions of governmental power and its effective enshrinement of two political parties.Certain evidence, though, suggests that some forms of partisanship in American political life are intensifying,'