Two Improvements to the Intentional Stance Theory

In this paper I assess the extent to which Daniel Dennett's Intentional Stance Theory fits into the overall proposal for a programme on naturalizing mental content outlined by Daniel Hutto and Glenda Satne in this issue (Philosophia 43, 2015). I argue that in order to fit the proposal, two changes need to be made: (1) the reality of intentional states should not (just) be grounded in the reality of behavioral patterns but in the ascription-independent status of Ur-intentionality that is the at the root of all intentionality, including content-involving intentonality. This is tricky since (i) Ur-intentionality resembles 'original intentionality', which is a notion Dennett rejects, and (ii) the ascription-dependent status of content-involving intentionality should be kept intact. (2) adopting the intentional stance is possible only as part of socio-cultural practices, which implies that this is an exclusively human capacity. I also argue that both changes to the theory are feasible and should be considered improvements relative to the original position developed by Dennett.