Tactical Doctrine and FM 100-5
Coville, Michael P.
Abstract
Coville, Michael P.
Abstract
This monograph will examine the presentation of tactical doctrine in FM 100-5. The United States Army is currently revising FM 100-5, Operations, its "keystone warfighting manual." It is intended to serve as the "Army's principle tool of professional self- education in the science and art of war." The current FM 100-5 contains both operational and tactical doctrine. The revision will implement in doctrine a new operational concept called AirLand Operations. It appears that the new edition of FM 100-5 will continue to reflect trends established during the revision of the two previous editions. If this course is maintained, the new edition will strengthen its focus on the operational level, expand its discussion of campaigns and address the use of forces in peacetime and crisis. As in other revisions, this will be accomplished at the expense of tactical doctrine. Unfortunately, it also seems likely that the new manual will be written without a full examination of the effects of the new operational concept on tactical doctrine. These trends threaten the effective expression of tactical doctrine in FM 100-5. If followed to fruition the current path will result in the presentation of tactical doctrine that may not fulfill its two essential purposes. First, the tactical doctrine presented may not account for the changes in operational doctrine, thus producing a lack of doctrinal coherence between the two levels of war. Second, the tactical doctrine may be presented so tersely that it will not serve as an effective guide for the production of subordinate tactical doctrine. Published under these conditions, FM 100-5 would degrade rather than enhance the Army's warfighting capability. The solution to this undesirable outcome is to conduct a full examination of the implications of the new operational concept on the tactical level of war prior to the publication of the new FM 100-5. This evaluation must rationally develop the linkage between the proposed operational concept and the requirements it generates at the tactical level. Existing concepts at the tactical level must then be reviewed for adequacy and revised where shortcomings exist. Finally, this revised tactical doctrine must be articulated clearly and in enough detail to support the coherent development of subordinate tactical doctrine.
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This monograph will examine the presentation of tactical doctrine in FM 100-5. The United States Army is currently revising FM 100-5, Operations, its "keystone warfighting manual." It is intended to serve as the "Army's principle tool of professional self- education in the science and art of war." The current FM 100-5 contains both operational and tactical doctrine. The revision will implement in doctrine a new operational concept called AirLand Operations. It appears that the new edition of FM 100-5 will continue to reflect trends established during the revision of the two previous editions. If this course is maintained, the new edition will strengthen its focus on the operational level, expand its discussion of campaigns and address the use of forces in peacetime and crisis. As in other revisions, this will be accomplished at the expense of tactical doctrine. Unfortunately, it also seems likely that the new manual will be written without a full examination of the effects of the new operational concept on tactical doctrine. These trends threaten the effective expression of tactical doctrine in FM 100-5. If followed to fruition the current path will result in the presentation of tactical doctrine that may not fulfill its two essential purposes. First, the tactical doctrine presented may not account for the changes in operational doctrine, thus producing a lack of doctrinal coherence between the two levels of war. Second, the tactical doctrine may be presented so tersely that it will not serve as an effective guide for the production of subordinate tactical doctrine. Published under these conditions, FM 100-5 would degrade rather than enhance the Army's warfighting capability. The solution to this undesirable outcome is to conduct a full examination of the implications of the new operational concept on the tactical level of war prior to the publication of the new FM 100-5. This evaluation must rationally develop the linkage between the proposed operational concept and the requirements it generates at the tactical level. Existing concepts at the tactical level must then be reviewed for adequacy and revised where shortcomings exist. Finally, this revised tactical doctrine must be articulated clearly and in enough detail to support the coherent development of subordinate tactical doctrine.
Key concepts: Doctrine, Peacetime, Military doctrine, Presentation (obstetrics), Political science, Engineering, Operational level of war, Law