Experience with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
Andy Morris
Abstract
Andy Morris
Abstract
The IMO International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities, hereafter referred to as the ISPS Code, or the Code, will enter into full effect on 01 July 2004. From the ship operator point of view, it is largely considered to be an unwelcome addition to the plethora of regulation by which the industry is bound. But it is somewhat surprising that the industry is only now being recognised as the 'soft target' for terrorist activity that it has in fact always been. Existing levels of security on ships vary considerably, from the virtually non-existent to the strict measures adopted on vessels such as nuclear fuel carriers. Even since the events of 11 September 2001, it has remained incredibly simple to gain access to most ships in many ports and even into key areas of the ship without being challenged in any way. As with the ISM Code, the industry's response to the ISPS Code can be expected to vary, dependant on the benefits that an operator believes will be obtained from a proper and full implementation of the requirements. This paper examines some of the key issues that have surfaced to date, and looks at how these are being dealt with in different ways.
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The IMO International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities, hereafter referred to as the ISPS Code, or the Code, will enter into full effect on 01 July 2004. From the ship operator point of view, it is largely considered to be an unwelcome addition to the plethora of regulation by which the industry is bound. But it is somewhat surprising that the industry is only now being recognised as the 'soft target' for terrorist activity that it has in fact always been. Existing levels of security on ships vary considerably, from the virtually non-existent to the strict measures adopted on vessels such as nuclear fuel carriers. Even since the events of 11 September 2001, it has remained incredibly simple to gain access to most ships in many ports and even into key areas of the ship without being challenged in any way. As with the ISM Code, the industry's response to the ISPS Code can be expected to vary, dependant on the benefits that an operator believes will be obtained from a proper and full implementation of the requirements. This paper examines some of the key issues that have surfaced to date, and looks at how these are being dealt with in different ways.
Key concepts: Port (circuit theory), Code (set theory), Computer security, Terrorism, Point (geometry), Key (lock), Operator (biology), Engineering