2014•Developments in marketing science: proceedings of the Academy of Marketing ScienceRequires access

Arrow’s General Impossibility Theorem and Five Collective Choice Rules: Pareto, Condorcet, Plurality, Approval Voting, and Borda

Khalid M. Dubas, James T. Strong

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Key concepts: Condorcet method, Arrow's impossibility theorem, Approval voting, Social choice theory, Mathematical economics, Arrow, Voting, Pareto principle

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Arrow’s General Impossibility Theorem and Five Collective Choice Rules: Pareto, Condorcet, Plurality, Approval Voting, and Borda — Research Paper | ScholarLens