Balancing Air and Missile Defense to Better Support Maneuver
Capt Vincent R. Wiggins
Abstract
Capt Vincent R. Wiggins
Abstract
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory. --Sun Tzu The U.S. Army is modernizing and cultivating specific echelons of air and missile defense (AMD) in response to evolving air and missile threats. According to Col. Robert Lyons, former director of the Department of the Army Military Operations Air Missile Defense, the projected threat force will be a sophisticated adversary consisting of multi-echeloned, asymmetric capabilities. (1) Upgrades and unit expansions in Army high-to-medium-altitude air defense (HIMAD) systems, such as Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, defend critical assets and help the United States and its allies maintain a strategic advantage around the world; these assets--for the purposes of this paper, called static-engagement-AMD--enable AMD from stationary locations. (2) However, the Army prioritizes static-engagement-AMD assets at the expense of aggressive maneuver tempo, resulting in an unbalanced execution of the Army's AMD strategy. For example, Army air defense artillery (ADA) includes fifteen Patriot battalions, which provide static-engagement-AMD, but only four active Avenger batteries and seven Army National Guard Avenger battalions, as of August 2015. These eleven Avenger units are the air defense's only remaining nonstatic-engagement-AMD formations. (3) This situation reflects a gap in the force's protective capabilities, through degraded AMD support of The brigade combat team (BCT) is designed for operations encompassing the entire range of military operations; it is the primary close-combat force of the U.S Army. (4) However, no AMD engagement assets are organic to the BCT, and this limits effectiveness because it limits integration. Maj. Gen. John G. Rossi, commanding general of the United States Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, offered a viable perspective an Association of the U.S. Army Transform the AMD Force panel in February 2015. According to Army reporter David Vergun, Rossi explained that AMD elements should improve communication with other forces, including BCTs, because are threats out there not just to combatant commanders; it's also BCTs saying we need you back in the game. (5) The Army's AMD strategy emphasizes the development of static-engagement-AMD assets and formations, but the solution to bridging the growing gap between aerial threat exposure and air defense for maneuver forces is to modernize, grow, and integrate nonstatic-engagement-AMD assets, such as the Avenger, into the BCT. Air Defense and Aggressive Maneuver Tempo Short-range air defense protects units against threats such as unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), rotary-wing aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft, and cruise missiles. Traditionally, forces have accomplished short-range air defense through nonstatic-engagement-AMD. Some HIMAD assets also can defend against these kinds of threats, but their capability to support an aggressive maneuver tempo--through expedited tactical mobility and shooting on the move--is nonexistent. Army forces need AMD assets that help them maneuver faster than their enemies. According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations, during operations dominated by combined arms maneuver, commanders normally seek to maintain a higher tempo than the enemy does; a rapid tempo can overwhelm an enemy's ability to counter friendly actions. It is the key to achieving a temporal advantage combined arms maneuver. (6) HIMAD weapon systems are static-engagement-AMD assets with extensive time requirements for emplacement. Maneuver commanders who depend on these assets need to assume risk in protection or initiative when operating outside the narrow protection zone they provide. In addition, HIMAD weapon systems cannot identify, track, or engage targets without radar radiating into the operational area. …
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[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory. --Sun Tzu The U.S. Army is modernizing and cultivating specific echelons of air and missile defense (AMD) in response to evolving air and missile threats. According to Col. Robert Lyons, former director of the Department of the Army Military Operations Air Missile Defense, the projected threat force will be a sophisticated adversary consisting of multi-echeloned, asymmetric capabilities. (1) Upgrades and unit expansions in Army high-to-medium-altitude air defense (HIMAD) systems, such as Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, defend critical assets and help the United States and its allies maintain a strategic advantage around the world; these assets--for the purposes of this paper, called static-engagement-AMD--enable AMD from stationary locations. (2) However, the Army prioritizes static-engagement-AMD assets at the expense of aggressive maneuver tempo, resulting in an unbalanced execution of the Army's AMD strategy. For example, Army air defense artillery (ADA) includes fifteen Patriot battalions, which provide static-engagement-AMD, but only four active Avenger batteries and seven Army National Guard Avenger battalions, as of August 2015. These eleven Avenger units are the air defense's only remaining nonstatic-engagement-AMD formations. (3) This situation reflects a gap in the force's protective capabilities, through degraded AMD support of The brigade combat team (BCT) is designed for operations encompassing the entire range of military operations; it is the primary close-combat force of the U.S Army. (4) However, no AMD engagement assets are organic to the BCT, and this limits effectiveness because it limits integration. Maj. Gen. John G. Rossi, commanding general of the United States Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, offered a viable perspective an Association of the U.S. Army Transform the AMD Force panel in February 2015. According to Army reporter David Vergun, Rossi explained that AMD elements should improve communication with other forces, including BCTs, because are threats out there not just to combatant commanders; it's also BCTs saying we need you back in the game. (5) The Army's AMD strategy emphasizes the development of static-engagement-AMD assets and formations, but the solution to bridging the growing gap between aerial threat exposure and air defense for maneuver forces is to modernize, grow, and integrate nonstatic-engagement-AMD assets, such as the Avenger, into the BCT. Air Defense and Aggressive Maneuver Tempo Short-range air defense protects units against threats such as unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), rotary-wing aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft, and cruise missiles. Traditionally, forces have accomplished short-range air defense through nonstatic-engagement-AMD. Some HIMAD assets also can defend against these kinds of threats, but their capability to support an aggressive maneuver tempo--through expedited tactical mobility and shooting on the move--is nonexistent. Army forces need AMD assets that help them maneuver faster than their enemies. According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations, during operations dominated by combined arms maneuver, commanders normally seek to maintain a higher tempo than the enemy does; a rapid tempo can overwhelm an enemy's ability to counter friendly actions. It is the key to achieving a temporal advantage combined arms maneuver. (6) HIMAD weapon systems are static-engagement-AMD assets with extensive time requirements for emplacement. Maneuver commanders who depend on these assets need to assume risk in protection or initiative when operating outside the narrow protection zone they provide. In addition, HIMAD weapon systems cannot identify, track, or engage targets without radar radiating into the operational area. …
Key concepts: Victory, Battle, Adversary, Aeronautics, Battlespace, Strategist, Missile defense, Computer security