The Reform of the UN Security Council
Mark F. Imber
Abstract
Mark F. Imber
Abstract
This article focuses on the United Nations' reform debates, particularly those surrounding changes to the Security Council. These debates are largely about rules, both formal and informal, that shape the roles of the veto powers and the ways in which other member-states can attain a seat on the Council. In order to implement the largely rule-governed system of collective security, it is necessary to have a Security Council that reflects a legitimate structure of authority. As the current debate demonstrates, however, the rules governing the powers of the Security Council raise numerous questions of legitimacy and authority, questions that are at the heart of a rule-governed order.
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This article focuses on the United Nations' reform debates, particularly those surrounding changes to the Security Council. These debates are largely about rules, both formal and informal, that shape the roles of the veto powers and the ways in which other member-states can attain a seat on the Council. In order to implement the largely rule-governed system of collective security, it is necessary to have a Security Council that reflects a legitimate structure of authority. As the current debate demonstrates, however, the rules governing the powers of the Security Council raise numerous questions of legitimacy and authority, questions that are at the heart of a rule-governed order.
Key concepts: Veto, Security council, Legitimacy, Political science, Order (exchange), Public administration, Law and economics, Law