Coordinating supply chain contracts with fuzzy demand
Ling-yu Huo, Bingwu Liu, Fang Yan
Abstract
Ling-yu Huo, Bingwu Liu, Fang Yan
Abstract
In a two-stage supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer, the supply chain coordination mechanism in fuzzy demand environment is researched. The market demands are regarded as fuzzy variable. The models of centralized decision-making, the return contract and revenue sharing contract are built based on credibility distribution and their optimal policies are also proposed under uncertain theory. Finally, take the triangular fuzzy numbers as an example, a numerical is given to illustrate the models and analyze the influence of parameters on the models. It shows that the contracts can coordinate the supply chain with fuzzy demand. The different wholesale price and return price tactics in return contract, and the different wholesale price in revenue sharing contract can be got by using different parameters. The fuzzy expected value of the profit for each actor in return contract can be equaled with that in revenue sharing contract by offered certain contract parameters.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
In a two-stage supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer, the supply chain coordination mechanism in fuzzy demand environment is researched. The market demands are regarded as fuzzy variable. The models of centralized decision-making, the return contract and revenue sharing contract are built based on credibility distribution and their optimal policies are also proposed under uncertain theory. Finally, take the triangular fuzzy numbers as an example, a numerical is given to illustrate the models and analyze the influence of parameters on the models. It shows that the contracts can coordinate the supply chain with fuzzy demand. The different wholesale price and return price tactics in return contract, and the different wholesale price in revenue sharing contract can be got by using different parameters. The fuzzy expected value of the profit for each actor in return contract can be equaled with that in revenue sharing contract by offered certain contract parameters.
Key concepts: Supply chain, Fuzzy logic, Revenue sharing, Profit (economics), Microeconomics, Credibility, Revenue, Supply chain management