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Provably Secure Password-Based Tripartite Key Exchange Protocol from Weil Pairing

Guo‐Min Li, HE Da-ke, Xianhui Lu

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Abstract

Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows the participants to share a session key using a human- memorable password only. In this paper, A provably- secure password-based authenticated tripartite key ex- change protocol(3-PAKE) is presented in the standard model. The security of the protocol is reduced to the De- cisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem, and the protocol provides not only the properties of forward secrecy, but also resistance against known key attacks.

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What this paper is about

Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows the participants to share a session key using a human- memorable password only. In this paper, A provably- secure password-based authenticated tripartite key ex- change protocol(3-PAKE) is presented in the standard model. The security of the protocol is reduced to the De- cisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem, and the protocol provides not only the properties of forward secrecy, but also resistance against known key attacks.

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Available abstract

Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows the participants to share a session key using a human- memorable password only. In this paper, A provably- secure password-based authenticated tripartite key ex- change protocol(3-PAKE) is presented in the standard model. The security of the protocol is reduced to the De- cisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem, and the protocol provides not only the properties of forward secrecy, but also resistance against known key attacks.

Key concepts: Authenticated Key Exchange, Password, Computer science, Forward secrecy, Key exchange, Computer security, S/KEY, Oakley protocol

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