Two improved authenticated multiple key exchange protocols.
Feng Liu
Abstract
Feng Liu
Abstract
Abastract: Many authenticated multiple key exchange protocols were published in recent years. In 2008, Lee et al. presented an authenticated multiple key exchange protocol based on bilinear pairings. However, Vo et al. demonstrated an impersonation attack on the protocol , and it failed to provide authenticity and perfect forward secrecy as they had claimed. Later, Vo et al. proposed their enhancement protocol conforming which conforms to all desirable security properties. But, Vo's protocol required any party had held the public key each other, which required a large amount of storage. In this paper, we propose two new authenticated multiple key exchange protocols based on Lee's protocol, and makes them immune against Vo et al.'s attacks.
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Abastract: Many authenticated multiple key exchange protocols were published in recent years. In 2008, Lee et al. presented an authenticated multiple key exchange protocol based on bilinear pairings. However, Vo et al. demonstrated an impersonation attack on the protocol , and it failed to provide authenticity and perfect forward secrecy as they had claimed. Later, Vo et al. proposed their enhancement protocol conforming which conforms to all desirable security properties. But, Vo's protocol required any party had held the public key each other, which required a large amount of storage. In this paper, we propose two new authenticated multiple key exchange protocols based on Lee's protocol, and makes them immune against Vo et al.'s attacks.
Key concepts: Oakley protocol, Authenticated Key Exchange, Computer science, Forward secrecy, Key (lock), Protocol (science), Key exchange, Computer security