Sidgwick's Philosophical Intuitions

Sidgwick famously claimed that an argument in favour of utilitarianism might be provided \nby demonstrating that a set of defensible philosophical intuitions undergird it. This paper \nfocuses on those philosophical intuitions. It aims to show which specific intuitions Sidgwick \nendorsed, and to shed light on their mutual connections. It argues against many rival \ninterpretations that Sidgwick maintained that six philosophical intuitions constitute the selfevident \ngrounds for utilitarianism, and that those intuitions appear to be specifications of a \nnegative principle of universalization (according to which differential treatments must be \nbased on reasonable grounds alone). In addition, this paper attempts to show how the \nintuitions function in the overall argument for utilitarianism. The suggestion is that the \nintuitions are the main positive part of the argument for the view, which includes Sidgwick's \nrejection of common-sense morality and its philosophical counterpart, dogmatic intuitionism. \nThe paper concludes by arguing that some of Sidgwick's intuitions fail to meet the conditions \nfor self-evidence which Sidgwick himself established and applied to the rules of common-sense \nmorality.