The Epistemology of Intuition and Seemings

Rationalism is the view that intuitions are a defeasible source of non-inferential justification. The first part of this dissertation is an exposition and defense of this view. I begin with an account of what it is for a proposition to seem true, arguing that seemings are a sui generis, irreducible propositional attitude that is importantly related to, yet distinct from, perceptual, memorial, and introspective experiences. I then defend the view that intuitions are seemings of a certain sort. I argue that seemings generally, and thus intuitions in particular, are a defeasible source of non-inferential justification, and I defend the epistemic value of seemings and intuitions against various objections. The second part of my dissertation assesses a familiar argument in defense of the epistemic value of intuitions. Roughly, the argument goes like this: “to have an argument which gives us a reason to reject the epistemic value of intuitions, one must rely on intuitions as though they had epistemic value. Thus, such arguments are self-defeating and are therefore unable to give us a reason to reject the epistemic value of intuitions.” Against this, I argue that some self-defeating arguments can give us a reason to not believe in the epistemic value of intuitions. I conclude my dissertation by addressing certain puzzles raised by the phenomenon of self-defeating arguments.