Cryptanalysis of a Knapsack Public Key Cryptosystem
Baocang Wang, Hui Liu, Yupu Hu
Abstract
Baocang Wang, Hui Liu, Yupu Hu
Abstract
Murakami and Nasako proposed a knapsack public key cryptosystem in 2008. They claimed that their proposal is secure against some known attacks. In this paper, we propose a cryptanalytic attack on the cryptosystem. We use a heuristic method to show that the secret key can be recovered with lattice reduction algorithms. Hence, their construction is insecure.
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Murakami and Nasako proposed a knapsack public key cryptosystem in 2008. They claimed that their proposal is secure against some known attacks. In this paper, we propose a cryptanalytic attack on the cryptosystem. We use a heuristic method to show that the secret key can be recovered with lattice reduction algorithms. Hence, their construction is insecure.
Key concepts: Knapsack problem, Cryptosystem, Hybrid cryptosystem, Cryptanalysis, Computer science, Key (lock), Public-key cryptography, Public key cryptosystem