The Death of Labor Law?
Cynthia Estlund
Abstract
Cynthia Estlund
Abstract
▪ Abstract This review tells three interlocking tales of decline, each with its respective prognosis for recovery: the declines of labor law scholarship, labor law, and organized labor. The relationship between the latter two and the role that a reformed labor law might play in reviving organized labor are matters of continuing controversy. In the meantime, two developments on the ground suggest a way forward for organized labor, labor law, and labor law scholars. Activist unions have found success with a new organizing model: neutrality and card-check agreements. Elsewhere, antisweatshop activists are developing increasingly sophisticated supplier codes and monitoring schemes to improve labor standards in developing countries. Both strategies, with their basically contractual architecture, exemplify what regulatory scholars are calling new governance. These strategies suggest a potential way around the roadblocks that meet labor law reform proposals and toward more agile and responsive forms of workplace governance.
OpenAlex reports 10 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
▪ Abstract This review tells three interlocking tales of decline, each with its respective prognosis for recovery: the declines of labor law scholarship, labor law, and organized labor. The relationship between the latter two and the role that a reformed labor law might play in reviving organized labor are matters of continuing controversy. In the meantime, two developments on the ground suggest a way forward for organized labor, labor law, and labor law scholars. Activist unions have found success with a new organizing model: neutrality and card-check agreements. Elsewhere, antisweatshop activists are developing increasingly sophisticated supplier codes and monitoring schemes to improve labor standards in developing countries. Both strategies, with their basically contractual architecture, exemplify what regulatory scholars are calling new governance. These strategies suggest a potential way around the roadblocks that meet labor law reform proposals and toward more agile and responsive forms of workplace governance.
Key concepts: Labour law, Labor relations, Corporate governance, Labor history, Labor disputes, Scholarship, Law, United States labor law