Elliot Choi
Abstract
This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Demand for Counterfeit Products Monopoly and Counterfeit Producers Stackelberg Leader Equilibrium Long-Run Equilibria Duopoly and Counterfeiters Subsidized Law Enforcement Tolerating Counterfeits Socially Optimal Counterfeiting Concluding Remarks
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This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Demand for Counterfeit Products Monopoly and Counterfeit Producers Stackelberg Leader Equilibrium Long-Run Equilibria Duopoly and Counterfeiters Subsidized Law Enforcement Tolerating Counterfeits Socially Optimal Counterfeiting Concluding Remarks
Key concepts: Counterfeit, Duopoly, Stackelberg competition, Monopoly, Enforcement, Business, Industrial organization, Commerce