Allocation of Transmission Losses in Electricity System Based on Cooperative Game Theory
Xinzhong Bao, Wei Cui
Abstract
Xinzhong Bao, Wei Cui
Abstract
An important problem of electricity market is how to allocate the transmission losses to each participants. Traditional allocation methods treat the losses more or less with a intersectant subsidy. In this paper, a new allocation model is put forward to deal with the transmission losses based on cooperative game theory, and shapley value method is recommended to solve the model. This method weights all joining orderings equally across all possible related coalitions, therefore impartial participants would consider fair. Finally, it is shown that the new method is feasible and reasonable by an example.
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An important problem of electricity market is how to allocate the transmission losses to each participants. Traditional allocation methods treat the losses more or less with a intersectant subsidy. In this paper, a new allocation model is put forward to deal with the transmission losses based on cooperative game theory, and shapley value method is recommended to solve the model. This method weights all joining orderings equally across all possible related coalitions, therefore impartial participants would consider fair. Finally, it is shown that the new method is feasible and reasonable by an example.
Key concepts: Shapley value, Cooperative game theory, Game theory, Cost allocation, Computer science, Electricity market, Transmission (telecommunications), Electricity