The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures
J. William Callison, Allan W. Vestal
Abstract
J. William Callison, Allan W. Vestal
Abstract
This paper considers low-profit limited liability companies (L3Cs). It determines that the L3C status provides no advantages regarding two of the stated reasons for the concept, namely enabling foundations to make program related investments and providing clearer fiduciary duty/governance rules, and concludes that the L3C form has little or no value and should be abandoned.
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This paper considers low-profit limited liability companies (L3Cs). It determines that the L3C status provides no advantages regarding two of the stated reasons for the concept, namely enabling foundations to make program related investments and providing clearer fiduciary duty/governance rules, and concludes that the L3C form has little or no value and should be abandoned.
Key concepts: Limited liability, Fiduciary, Business, Limited partnership, Limited liability partnership, Corporate governance, Liability, Duty