2006•International Studies ReviewRequires access

Is the New Europe a Good Substitute for the Old One?26

Wade Jacoby

Open publisher page 6 citations

Abstract

NATO has long provided a military framework for mutual defense against external aggressors. It may not do so much longer. At least since the 1990s, NATO has also provided for united efforts to punish rogue leaders or bring peace to war-torn regions. This contribution of NATO may also be in danger. Collective defense and peace enforcement are valuable resources and ones that would be difficult to replace—or to rebuild. In order to pursue either collective defense or peace enforcement, NATO members have certain military obligations toward one another. Newer NATO members felt these pressures quite keenly after joining in 1999. During the run-up to the Iraq war, however, the government of the United States made a considered judgment to downgrade those obligations—to trade away pressure on the newer NATO members to upgrade their military capabilities and competencies—in exchange for displays of political loyalty to Washington in the United Nations and elsewhere.27 In this essay the argument is made that this trade was a bad idea. The states at the heart of “New Europe”—the generally pro-US states that joined NATO during its 1999 enlargement—are not yet the kind of partners that US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has publicly imagined them to be. Certainly, they are no substitute for the “old” NATO alliance. Although NATO will probably continue to exist in some form whatever path is chosen, a politically cohesive and militarily effective NATO may well be on its way out.

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What this paper is about

NATO has long provided a military framework for mutual defense against external aggressors. It may not do so much longer. At least since the 1990s, NATO has also provided for united efforts to punish rogue leaders or bring peace to war-torn regions. This contribution of NATO may also be in danger. Collective defense and peace enforcement are valuable resources and ones that would be difficult to replace—or to rebuild. In order to pursue either collective defense or peace enforcement, NATO members have certain military obligations toward one another. Newer NATO members felt these pressures quite keenly after joining in 1999. During the run-up to the Iraq war, however, the government of the United States made a considered judgment to downgrade those obligations—to trade away pressure on the newer NATO members to upgrade their military capabilities and competencies—in exchange for displays of political loyalty to Washington in the United Nations and elsewhere.27 In this essay the argument is made that this trade was a bad idea. The states at the heart of “New Europe”—the generally pro-US states that joined NATO during its 1999 enlargement—are not yet the kind of partners that US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has publicly imagined them to be. Certainly, they are no substitute for the “old” NATO alliance. Although NATO will probably continue to exist in some form whatever path is chosen, a politically cohesive and militarily effective NATO may well be on its way out.

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Available abstract

NATO has long provided a military framework for mutual defense against external aggressors. It may not do so much longer. At least since the 1990s, NATO has also provided for united efforts to punish rogue leaders or bring peace to war-torn regions. This contribution of NATO may also be in danger. Collective defense and peace enforcement are valuable resources and ones that would be difficult to replace—or to rebuild. In order to pursue either collective defense or peace enforcement, NATO members have certain military obligations toward one another. Newer NATO members felt these pressures quite keenly after joining in 1999. During the run-up to the Iraq war, however, the government of the United States made a considered judgment to downgrade those obligations—to trade away pressure on the newer NATO members to upgrade their military capabilities and competencies—in exchange for displays of political loyalty to Washington in the United Nations and elsewhere.27 In this essay the argument is made that this trade was a bad idea. The states at the heart of “New Europe”—the generally pro-US states that joined NATO during its 1999 enlargement—are not yet the kind of partners that US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has publicly imagined them to be. Certainly, they are no substitute for the “old” NATO alliance. Although NATO will probably continue to exist in some form whatever path is chosen, a politically cohesive and militarily effective NATO may well be on its way out.

Key concepts: Alliance, Argument (complex analysis), Politics, Law, Political science, Collective security, Government (linguistics), Order (exchange)

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