1985•Journal of Accounting ResearchRequires access

A Laboratory Investigation of the Moral Hazard Problem in an Agency Relationship

Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Russell J. Lundholm, Wilfred C. Uecker

Abstract

Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Russell J. Lundholm, Wilfred C. Uecker, A Laboratory Investigation of the Moral Hazard Problem in an Agency Relationship, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 23, Studies on Accounting Earnings and Security Valuation: Current Research Issues (1985), pp. 81-120

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Available abstract

Key concepts: Moral hazard, Agency (philosophy), Actuarial science, Outcome (game theory), Principal–agent problem, Hazard, Adverse selection, Liability